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The European Community Approach to
Standardization: A Possible Mechanism for
Improved Nonmember State Input
Dan R. Mastromarco*
I. The Importance of EC Standardization
The successful harmonization, implementation, and enforce-
ment of product standards' is of paramount importance to the reali-
zation of a fully integrated European Community (EC) 2 as
contemplated by the Single European Act.3 The traditional lack of
coordination in the development of product standards among the
twelve EC Member States4 and the failure mutually to recognize test-
ing and certification procedures have prevented efficient product
Assistant Chief Counsel for Tax Policy, U.S. Small Business Administration. The
views expressed herein are wholly the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of the
Small Business Administration. The author would like to thank Pat Cooke, Don Mackay,
Walter Leight, and Stephen Cooney for their valuable suggestions.
I Product standards are different from certification and testing in that they are gen-
erally voluntary, technical specifications that are approved by a standard setting body. Cer-
tification attests that a product complies with technical specifications; for some products
the manufacturer can declare conformity, but for others certification by a third party is
necessary. Most of the standards discussed herein are product standards, but there are
also process and production standards involving, for example, good laboratory practice
and limits on beef hormones. Harmonization priorities have been assigned to standards
for everything from toys, to cosmetics, to machine safety, to tire pressure gauges, to earth
moving equipment, to radio interference. See Cooke & Mackay, The New EC Approach to
Harmonization of Standards and Certification, 109 Bus. AM., Aug. 1, 1988, at 7 [hereinafter
Cooke & Mackay].
2 As one commentator has noted: "For industry and consumers, the most important
goal of the European Economic Community is the creation of common technical stan-
dards." Jenkins, Harmonization of Safety Standards, 4 EUR. TRENDS 53, 53 (1987).
3 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) (1987) (The Single European Act, adopted in
February 1986, amended the Treaty of Rome). See generally The Single Act: A New Frontier for
Europe 1987 BULL. EUR. COMM. (Supp. 1/87) (COM No. 100) (discussing the goals of inte-
gration within the EC by 1992 and the Commission's programs toward cohesion). By the
end of 1992, the EC intends to complete its internal market and remove substantially all
physical, technical, and fiscal barriers to the exchange of goods, services, people, and capi-
tal within the Community. The basis for the effort to unify Europe is a 1985 EC White
Paper, Completing the Internal Market, WHITE PAPER FROM THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL (Cat. No. 43-85-894-EN-C). (1985) [hereinafter
WHITE PAPER]. See also EC Promotes Europe s HDTV Standard, I EUROPE-1992: THE REPORT
ON THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET 72-73 (1989).
4 Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany (West), Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom comprise the European
Community.
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marketing throughout the EC, affecting firms both within and with-
out the EC. Some manufacturers have been forced to modify prod-
ucts and retool in order to comply with frequently changing,
country-specific requirements. 5 Other firms, especially smaller com-
panies, have been discouraged from expanding into new markets. 6
From the consumers' perspective, the need to have products modi-
fied, tested, retested, certified, and recertified for export to markets
in neighboring countries causes delay, stifles competition, increases
costs, and may reduce product selection. 7
The concept behind harmonized standards throughout the EC is
unassailable and is generally supported by U.S. exporters8 and EC
nationals. 9 Uniform health, safety, and environmental standards,' 0 if
properly implemented, would benefit most exporters to the EC as
well as most Member State industries by eliminating barriers to the
efficient flow of goods, and perhaps services, throughout the EC.1
5 Thompson, EC92, NATION'S BUSINESS, June 1989, at 22.
6 Grant, The Effects of Product Standardization on Competition: Octane Grading of Petrol in
the UK, in PRODUCT STANDARDIZATION AND COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 284 (H. Gabel ed. 1987)
[hereinafter Grant]. See COMM. ON COMMERCE AND INT'L TRADE, OBSTACLES FACED BY
SMALL BUSINESS EXPORTERS, S. REP. No. 249, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); Comment, U.S.
Government Export Incentives for Small Business, 22 INT'L LAW. 791 (1988).
7 Farrell & Saloner, Competition, Compatibility and Standards: The Economics of Horses,
Penguins and Lemmings, in PRODUCT STANDARDIZATION AND COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 1-19 (H.
Gabel ed. 1987) [hereinafter Farrell & Saloner]; Hayes, Who Sets the Standards?:" One Reason
for the Trade Deficit, FORBES, Apr. 17, 1989, at 110 [hereinafter Hayes] (citing the delay of
entry into Saudi Arabian port of a shipment of nonconforming goods from Clorox and
Westinghouse).
8 p. CECCHINI, 1992 THE EUROPEAN CHALLENGE: THE BENEFITS OF A SINGLE MARKET,
ch. 4 (1988).
9 European Consumers: Their Interest, Aspirations and Knowledge on Consumer Affairs 132
(EC No. CT X/509/76-E) (May 1976) (results and analysis of a sample survey carried out
by the EC) [maintained in the office of the N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.]. This analysis of
data from 9,500 individuals from nine Member States indicated that the attitudes of con-
sumers were six to one in favor of the common market. Nearly 70% took the view that
integration will enable consumers to have a wider range of products. Id.
10 Standards for health, safety, and the environment are mandated via EC Directives.
The Directives establish the framework for these standards which are then worked out in
the technical committees of the European regional standard setting bodies. See infra notes
45-56 and accompanying text (discribing the Directive stage standard setting). Other stan-
dards are not mandatory, but are harmonized through the regional, voluntary, standard
setting bodies. See infra 71-77 and accompanying text.
I I See Branstad & Waldenstrom, Europe 1992: Threat or Opportunity, in SPECIAL REPORT
OF Booz ALLEN & HAMILTON 5 (1989).
According to the U.S. Department of Commerce the harmonization process, in con-
junction with positive changes to promote greater efficiency and economic growth, is pro-
jected to increase demand for U.S. goods by $260 billion. Verity, U.S. Business Needs to
Prepare Now For Europe's Single Internal Market, 109 Bus. AM., Aug. 1, 1988, at 2 (statement
of C. William Verity, U.S. Secretary of Commerce). The EC, as a whole, will constitute a
market of 320 million people, with a Gross Domestic Product of $702 billion. Further-
more, this market is a major consumer of U.S. products; 24% of all U.S. exports were sold
to the EC. See Europe 1992: Economic Integration Plan, Hearngs Before the Subcomms. on Europe
and the Middle East, and on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 287 (1989) (Hrg. Rep. 23-441) (statement of Manuel Peralta
of the American National Standards Institute) [hereinafter Hrg. Rep. 23-441]. U.S. ex-
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As one commentator observed, uniform standards may also "con-
tribute to raising the global standard of living by allowing surplus
goods from one area to find markets where needed."' 12 Establishing
uniform standards throughout the EC will facilitate the movement of
goods, stimulate competition, and reduce product costs.
Specific benefits of standardization for the producer include a
reduction of average costs through scale economies; cost reduction
through use of interchangeable parts; a reduction of storage and of
logistics costs in international or interfirm trade; a reduction of lia-
bility insurance costs in the case of potentially unsafe or unhealthy
products; and a facilitation of corporate strategies emphasizing qual-
ity control on a permanent basis.1 3 The benefits of standardization
for the consumer include a reduction in the costs of information with
respect to the properties, quality, or compatibility of products and
components; a reduction in the cost of learning how to use a prod-
uct, for example, cameras, computers, and typewriters; network ex-
ternaliti es;' 4 and an appreciation of some of the benefits that accrue
to producers. 15
Exporters to the EC, however, fear that the standards being
promulgated and the certification and testing procedures being
adopted' 6 will serve to hinder, rather than facilitate access to the EC
market.' 7 Directives, regulations, and standards intended to harmo-
ports to the EC were valued at $75 billion in 1988, accounting for approximately 2 million
U.S. jobs. The European Community's Plan to Integrate Its Economy by 1992: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm.on Foreign Affairs, 10 1st
Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 15 (1989) (Hrg. Rep. No. 23-360) (statement of Glennon Harrison,
analyst in International Trade and Finance, Congressional Research Service) [hereinafter
Hrg. Rep. 23-360].
12 J. Ready, ANSI Standards X. 12 and X. 400: A Study of the Social Issues Caused by Stand-
ardization 44 (Georgetown Univ. Thesis 5725).
13 Farrell & Saloner, supra note 7, at 6-17.
14 Network externalities are positive external consumption benefits, i.e., the sense
that the utility derived by a consumer from the use of a product increases with the number
of other consumers purchasing compatible products.
I5 Farrell & Saloner, supra note 7, at 6. "In a perfectly competitive market all cost
savings that reduce marginal costs are passed on to buyers . I..." Id. at 18 n.4. For specific
case studies, see Pelkmans & Beuter, Standardization and Competitiveness: Private and Public
Strategies in the EC Color TV Industry, in PRODUCT STANDARDIZATION AND COMPETITIVE STRAT-
EGY 171 (H. Gabel 1987); Grant, supra note 6, at 283; Rohlfs, A Theory of Interdependent
Demand for Communications Service, 5 BELLJ. ECON. 16, 16-37 (1974).
16 The United States hopes to reach an accord with the EC whereby testing and certi-
fication for EC-destined products can take place in the United States. European Single Mar-
ket: Issues of Concern to U.S. Exporters, Report to the Chairman, Subcomm. on Int'l Trade, of the
Senate Comm. on Finance 21 (GAO No. NSIAD-90-60 European Market) (1990) [hereinafter
European Single Market]. It is not clear at this time whether all U.S.-made products that
require certification will have to be tested by an EC-accredited body. "The EC Commis-
sion proposal ofJuly 1989 provides for negotiations with non-EC governments to enable
EC 'notified bodies' to accept test data and certificates from non-EC testing bodies." Id.
17 See, e.g., De Smedt, Common Market, Single Market or Fortress Europe?, 7 INT'L FIN. L.
REV. 14, 14-15 (1988); Rosenbaum, European Standards Panek Americans Keep Away!, 15
ELECTRONICS Bus., July 24, 1989, at 95-96. The U.S. Government has also expressed this
concern. See U.S. GOV'T INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON THE E.C. INTERNAL MARKET, PUB.
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nize product requirements may result in the inadvertent exclusion of
nonmember state trade with the Community if adopted without
meaningful consideration of nonmember viewpoints.' 8 Such a pro-
cess acts to the detriment of all participants in the stream of com-
merce-EC consumers as well as EC and non-EC exporting
industries. 19
Recognizing the far-reaching effects of EC standardization ef-
forts, 20 nonmember state exporters have been keenly interested in
participating in critical stages of the standard-setting process. 2 l To
date, though, most of these exporters have had limited access to the
formal EC standardization process.22 The EC Commission, which
initiates legislation, has thought it inappropriate to grant nonmem-
ber industries the opportunity to review and comment during the
development of proposed EC Directives. 23 Instead, the Commission
No. 1288, COMPLETION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY INTERNAL MARKET: AN INITIAL AS-
SESSMENT OF CERTAIN ECONOMIC POLICY ISSUES RAISED BY ASPECTS OF THE EC's PROGRAM
(Dec. 1988).
18 Hayes, supra note 7, at 110 (criticizing the U.S. failure to take advantage of interna-
tional standard setting organizations).
19 See Cooke & Mackay, supra note 1, at 8.
20 Hrg. Rep. 23-441, supra note 11, at 226-27 (testimony of Steve Lovett, Pres. of
Forest Product Industries Association, Apr. 13, 1989).
21 The desire of industry to participate in the EC standard setting process, whether
the standards are mandatory or voluntary, is best exhibited by the record of comments
received in Congressional hearings and at U.S. Department of Commerce hearings. See
generally Hrg:Rep. 23-441, supra note I 1 (a compilation of the oral and written statements
received). The U.S. Government Interagency Working Group on EC Standards, Testing
and Certification Issues received oral comments from 23 witnesses at the Department of
Commerce hearings, ranging from statements by Manuel Peralta of the American National
Standards Institutes to Doug Thompson of the Toy Manufacturers of America. Another
29 written submissions were reviewed, mostly from specific exporting companies. Id. See
also U.S. Dept. of Commerce News, Office of the Secretary, Press Release No. G 89-14
(May 31, 1989) (regarding a meeting between U.S. Secretary of Commerce Mosbacher and
Martin Bangemann, EC Vice President for Internal Market and Industrial Affairs on May
31, 1989, over the issue of lack of access to EC standards setting boards); CONG. RES.
SERV., LIBR. OF CONG., 101ST CONG., IST SESS., EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: ISSUES RAISED BY
1992 INTEGRATION, REPORT PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
POLICY AND TRADE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Comm. Print 1989) (Staff
Rep. 98-597).
22 Effect of Greater Economic Integration Within the European Community of the
United States, USITC Pub. No. 2204, 6-8 n.8 (1989).
On the other hand Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland are
the members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). EFTA is represented on
the technical committees of the Committee for European Standardization (CEN) and the
Committee for European Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC) and so has had the
opportunity to participate in the voluntary standard setting process. Id. at 12. See infra
note 49 and accompanying text. See generally Iloniemi, The Possibilities for a Moderate Integra-
tion Policy, 61 UNITAS (Finland) 34, 34-40 (1989). CEN and CENELEC are defined as non-
governmental European standardization bodies. Cooke & Mackay, supra note 1, at 9. CEN
and CENELEC represent both EC member countries and EFTA countries.as well. See infra
note 67 and accompanying text.
23 John Farnell, Director of the Division of Standardization and Certification in the
EC office of the Directorate-General for Internal Market and Industrial Affairs has said:
"It is not in the interests of the Community ... to open European standard setting for
manufactured goods and products to U.S. and other non-EC industry representatives." EC
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has generally consulted only with EC industry and Member States in
drafting the essential requirements2 4 for standards. 2 5 Non-EC mem-
ber industries have been excluded from the voting technical commit-
tees of the Committee for European Standardization (CEN) and the
Committee for European Electrotechnical Standardization.
(CENELEC), and those industries without a European presence have
not been given observer status at committee meetings. 2 6 In a later
stage, when the Directives are forwarded to the voluntary standard
setting bodies, nonmember input is again blocked. Non-EC mem-
bers have been able to provide input only after the standards have
been published in final proposed form. 27 At each stage in the pro-
cess nonmember state industry input is prevented until it is too late
for meaningful consideration of their views.
This Article briefly describes the current standard setting proce-
dures within the EC 28 and suggests that the Community should: (1)
Official Rejects Role for Outsiders on Standards, But Promised Flexibility, Daily Executive Rep.
(BNA) No. 82, at A-I (May 1, 1989) (speaking at a press briefing on Apr. 27, 1989, follow-
ing a U.S. Department of Commerce administrative hearing on the exclusion of U.S. cor-
porate access to European standard setting boards). Farnell indicated that the EC will
"resist" recent requests for participation in these processes from U.S. manufacturers and
others. Id. Farnell further indicated, however, that the EC will allow greater transparency
through the publication of monthly reviews of activities of CEN and CENELEC to the
American National Standards Institute (ANSI). Id. Such statements have confirmed fear
over a lack of access to regional standard setting boards.
24 "Essential requirements" are broadly worded directives that define the frameworks
for health, safety, and environmental standards applicable to products or processes. These
essential requirements become law throughout the EC community and are developed into
more specific technical requirements in the technical committees of the regional standard
setting bodies, such as CEN and CENELEC. WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, para. 68, at 20.
25 John Kinn, Staff Vice-President for the Electronics Industry Association, stated:
I can show you a set of correspondence.., between ourselves and ETSI
[European Telecommunications Standards Institute] in which [the electron-
ics industries] have specifically asked to participate in the ETSI committees.
And quite frankly, we have another letter back from them specifically stating
that they will not do that. We are clearly at a disadvantage and we need to
... take the steps to try to rectify that situation.
Hrg. Rep. 23-441, supra note 11, at 234.
Mr. Lovett, Vice President for the International Trade Council, National Forest Prod-
ucts Association, stated "[Our] [a]ssociations have been excluded from this process. They
have requested to attend the CEN meetings. They are not travelling from the United
States. They are based and established in Europe. But they have been excluded." Id. at
262.
26 Again, EFTA coutries are exceptions in that they have enjoyed limited access. See
supra note 22 and accompanying text. Also, the ETSI, "an autonomous body set up in
1988 to develop telecommunications standards in Europe.... allows nonmember organi-
zations to obtain observer status, conveying the right to speak, but not to vote." European
Single Market, supra riote 16, at 17.
27 Hrg. Rep. 23-441, supra note 11, at 295. See infra notes 45-56 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the standard setting procedure. In sum, after successive drafts, the
EC Commission proposes a Directive containing "essential requirements" of a standard
which is transmitted simultaneously to the Parliament and the Council for development in
an iterative process. When signed by the Council, the Directive is normally accompanied
by a mandate to the private sector standard bodies, CEN and CENELEC, to formulate
voluntary standards.
28 See infra notes 45-56 and accompanying text.
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formalize procedures leading to the development of standards, test-
ing, and certification criteria;29 and (2) provide for a means of partic-
ipation in this process by all interested parties.30 The Article
proposes that the EC would benefit by adopting 'a mechanism,
modeled after the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act (APA),3' to en-
sure that comments by non-EC member industries are considered. It
is beyond the scope of this Article to describe in detail a comprehen-
sive application of the APA to standard setting in the EC. Instead,
this Article calls for an open dialogue on the best means to achieve a
more efficient standard setting process and suggests that the APA is
a valuable model on which to base these decisions.
The APA's notice and comment provisions permit companies,
both foreign and domestic, to comment on all rules, including stan-
dards, proposed by U.S. Governmental agencies.32 Much of the
rulemaking taking place in government agencies, especially the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, the Federal Communications Com-
mission, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the
Federal Aviation Administration, the Consumer Products Safety
Commission, and the Department of Agriculture involves standard
setting. These agencies alone may mandate federal standards. They
issue standards in a wide variety of matters, but such standards con-
cern all matters encompassed by the EC Directives standard setting
29 See infra notes 57-77 and accompanying text.
30 Id.
31 Pub. L. No. 404, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) amended by Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80
Stat. 378 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (1988)). More specif-
ically, the mechanism should be modeled after the note and comment provisions of §§ 553
and 556. Id. See infra 78-92 and accompanying text.
32 Id. § 553(c). The APA draws no distinction between foreign based companies and
domestic companies in its requirements to consider views and to base a decision upon
those views. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988). There are numerous instances in which U.S. agencies
in the process of setting both voluntary and mandatory standards have considered the
views of non-U.S. companies and representatives. Some examples where foreign views
were considered in Department of Agriculture rulemaking proceedings are: 51 Fed. Reg.
23,037 (1986) (codified at 7 C.F.R. § 28.402); 51 Fed. Reg. 12,498 (1986) (codified at 7
C.F.R. §§ 925, 944); 51 Fed. Reg. 41,071 (1986) (codified at 7 C.F.R. § 966); 51 Fed. Reg.
17,354 (1986) (codified at 7 C.F.R. § 980); 52 Fed. Reg. 8,865 (1987) (codified at 7 C.F.R.
§§ 925, 944); 52 Fed. Reg. 5,307 (1987) (codified at 7 C.F.R. §§ 982, 999); 54 Fed. Reg.
48,735 (1989) (codified at 7 C.F.R. § 810). In addition, non-U.S. companies are repre-
sented and vote on some of the technical committees of U.S. standard setting boards. See
Hrg. Rpt. No. 23-441, supra note 11, at 295-96 (statement ofJoe Bhatia, Vice President,
Governmental Affairs for Underwriters Laboratories, Inc.). See generally Thorp, Standards
and International Relatiois, in NATIONAL STANDARDS IN A MODERN ECONOMY ch. 32 (D. Reck
ed. 1958).
There are, however, a number of nongovernmental standard setting bodies in the
United States composed of industry associations, for which input is only possible by mem-
bership. There are over 400 nongovernmental standard setting bodies in the United States
according to the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST). NAT'L BUREAU
OF STANDARDS, PUB. No. 681, STANDARDS ACTIVITIES OF ORGANIZATIONS IN THE U.S. (1984)
(currently being revised). These standard setting bodies have been responsible for the
issuance of approximately 30,000 voluntary standards. European Single Market, supra note
16, at 15.
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process for health, safety, and the environment. Development of a
formal mechanism to consider the views of non-EC member indus-
tries in an organized manner would promote the underlying purpose
of the Single European Act, 3 3 would be consistent with the treatment
of foreign-based firms under formal U.S. rulemaking procedures, 34
and would benefit the EC and its trading partners by improving the
prospect of foreign trade, reducing incompatibility of goods, and by
making the production of goods more efficient. 3 5
II. The EC's "New Approach" to Standard Setting
The EC has resolved to harmonize standards and procedures for
testing and certification in order to allow products to circulate freely
within the Community by the end of 1992.36 The movement towards
full EC standard harmonization is derived from the general principle
that "if a product is lawfully manufactured and marketed in one
Member State, there is no reason why it should not be sold freely
throughout the Community. ' 37
In order to unify standards and adopt procedures for the mutual
recognition of testing and certification the EC recently discarded the
approach it had followed for more than twenty-five years in favor of a
33 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) (1987). Community law is derived from an "ap-
proximation" of the collective legal principles of the member states. Article 3 of the EEC
Treaty provides that "the activities of the Community shall include ... the approximation
of the laws of the member States . Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, arts. 3, 298
U.N.T.S. 3, at 7.
34 The comparison between the EC Directives standard setting process and the U.S.
process was briefly described in Congressional hearings:
Cong. GEJOENSON. What about the consumer product safety standard?
Those aren't mandatory?
Mr. KINN. Those are mandatory.
Cong. GEJDENSON. . . . Do the Europeans have total access to those? Is
it a totally transparent process?
Mr. KINN. To the degree that they appear before the Consumer Product
Safety Commission-
Cong. GEJDENSON. Treated just like any other American company.
Mr. KINN [continuing]. They would be treated like anyone else ....
Hrg. Rpt. 23-44 1, supra note 11, at 271 (testimony ofJohn Kinn, Staff Vice President of the
Electronic Industries Association).
35 Consistency in the iterative process of developing standards may lead to consis-
tency in the substance of such standards. At the very least the adoption of a formal mecha-
nism modeled after the APA will allay the fears of nonmember states by creating a public
forum for the consideration of their views. It will also permit introduction of a wider range
of studies on the effects of certain production and process methods on health, safety, and
the environment, and will give participants faith in the process of standard development.
36 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) art. i3, at 7 (1987) (Single European Act). See
Lamoriello, Completing the Internal Market by 1992: The EC's Legislative Program for Business
109 Bus. AM., Aug. 1, 1988, at 4-5 (discussing the harmonization process and listing prior-
ity harmonization areas).
37 WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, para. 58, at 20. For a detailed discussion of the ration-
ale for the harmonization effort and the "new strategy" chosen see paras. 57-80 of the
WHITE PAPER. See also Hrg. Rpt. No. 23-360, supra note I1, at 44.
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"new approach."'38 In order to progress quickly on unifying stan-
dards the "new approach" to standardization adopted two significant
changes geared towards greater flexibility and expediency. First, the
new procedure provides for qualified majority3 9 approval of Direc-
tives by EC member countries. 40 The traditional approach, based
upon Article 100 of the Treaty of Rome,4 1 generally required unani-
mous approval by Member States for the creation of Directives.
42
Technical standards were written directly into EC legislation.4 3
Although unanimity served to safeguard the interests of individual
Member States, it contributed to a greater evil-delayin achieving
the goals of integration by 1992. Second, for nonessential character-
istics of products mutual EC Member State recognition of the ade-
quacy of national standards is required. 44
A. The European Community Directives Standard Setting Apparatus
There are two distinct processes at work in the efforts to harmo-
nize standards in the EC. In the first process-the Directive standard
setting process-certain standardization priorities for "regulated
products" are set by the EC and its members through the Council.
45
The Directives promulgated by the EC under this process are limited
to defining "essential requirements" for health, safety, environmen-
tal, and in some cases, industrial policy concerns as determined by
the Commission, 4 6 Parliament, and the Council of Ministers. 47 The
task of developing technical specifications to implement the Direc-
38 WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, paras. 60-61, at 17-18. 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169)
arts. 6-7, at 5-6 (1987).
39 Under qualified majority voting principles, different EC member states are given
different numbers of votes. Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom each have ten
votes; Spain has eight; Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece, and Portugal each have five;
Denmark and Ireland each have three; and Luxembourg has two. Fifty-four votes are re-
quired for Community action; therefore, the minimum number of member states required
to take Community action is seven. Hrg. Rpt. No. 23-441, supra note 11, at 289.
40 WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, paras. 67-68, at 20.
41 Treaty of Rome, supra note 33, arts. 100, 298 U.N.T.S. at 54.
42 See WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, para. 61, at 18 (calling for more flexibility in the
operation of article 100). Majority vote was permitted, however, for veterinary and
phytosanitary controls under Article 43 of the Treaty of Rome. Treaty of Rome, supra note
33, art. 43, 298 U.N.T.S. at 32-33.
43 European Single Market, supra note 16, at 16.
44 See WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, para. 77, at 22.
45 Cooke & Mackay, supra note 1, at 8.
46 The seventeen-member Commission, in effect the executive branch of the EC, is
entrusted with the interests of the Community as a whole, independent of political or na-
tionalistic concerns. Sitkov, The European Economic Community: A Sovereign Entity Under its
Own Legal Order, 16 INT'LJ. LEGAL INFO. 177, 183 (1988) [hereinafter Sitkov].
47 The Council of Ministers consists of the Heads of State or Heads of Government
from the twelve Member States, and is the principal centralized legislative body of the EC.
See Treaty of Rome, supra note 33, arts. 145-46, 298 U.N.T.S. at 69. The Council's task is
to set the law of the Community by making regulations, guidelines, and decisions. For a




tives is then usually delegated to certain nongovernmental, re-
gional 48 bodies that are authorized to act by qualified majority vote.
Such regional bodies include the Comiti Europein de la Normalisation
(CEN), which deals with mechanical standards, and the Comiti
Europein de Normalisation Electrotechnique Standardisation (CENELEC),
which deals with electrical standards. CEN and CENELEC are made
up of national standard setting boards. 4 9 These private, regional
standard setting bodies formulate specific technical standards meet-
ing the essential requirements in harmony, if possible, with interna-
tional standards.
The second process involves the continuing efforts of the pri-
vate standard setting bodies to unify standards. Where national
product regulations already exist, the regional standard bodies are
responsible for their harmonization. 50 CEN and CENELEC's policy
is to base their work on international standardization organizations,
which may be adopted with modification to meet EC criteria. 5 '
When CEN and CENELEC commence work on a European-wide
standard, the national committees cease work until the European
standard is finalized. Individual Member States may adopt their own
unique standards only if uniform standards are not promulgated for
the EC.
5 2
These two processes, so vital to the success of the integration of
the EC as contemplated by the Single European Act, will eventually
culminate in the replacement of all national regulatory standards
with uniform standards applicable throughout the EC. 53 This devel-
opment is a logical extension from the removal of border controls. 54
The Council of Ministers has acted swiftly, initiating an ambi-
tious program consisting of more than 200 Directives intended to
eliminate differing standards. 5 5 Moreover, a high percentage of in-
48 "Regional" encompasses both EFTA and EC countries. See supra note 22 and
accompanying text.
49 See supra note 22. These boards are generally funded by their respective govern-
ments and promulgate what have been described as "quasi-governmental" standards. See
Hrg. Rpt. No. 23-441, supra note 11, at 269.
50 See WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, paras. 71-80, at 20-21.
51 Two examples of international standard setting bodies are the International Elec-
trotechnical Commission (IEC) and the International Standards Organization (ISO). See
U.S. Dept. of Commerce News, International Trade Administration, Press Release No.
ITA 89-68 (Oct. 6, 1989) (joint press release communique in which U.S.-EC officials reaf-
firmed their commitment to the work of international standardization bodies).
52 See WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, para. 4, at 4. "The Treaty [of Rome] clearly envis-
ages from the outset the creation of a single integrated internal market free of restriction
on the movement of goods .... Id. Existing European standardization bodies have been
recently restructured into a coherent group with a clear framework for mutual consultation
and decision-making.
53 Id. para. 69, at 20.
54 Id. para. 11, at 6. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
55 See P. COOKE, A SUMMARY OF THE NEW EUROPEAN APPROACH TO STANDARDS DEVEL-
OPMENT (Nat'l Bureau of Standards Pub. No. NBSIR 88-3793, 1988). "High priority" ar-
eas have included gaseous emissions, diesel particulates, helicopter exhaust noise, food
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ternational standards adopted as national standards by EC member
state standard setting institutes have facilitated harmonization. 56
B. The European Community Notification and Comment Provisions
The "new approach" to standardization contemplates several
notification and comment requirements to ensure that affected
groups within the EC are aware of proposals to set standards and
have the opportunity to influence those proposals. According to the
Commission's 1985 White Paper "it is essential that in all program-
mes designed to achieve a unified internal market, the interests of all
sections likely to be affected, e.g. both sides of industry, commerce
and consumers are taken into account."' 57 Accordingly, the Commis-
sion has taken steps to ensure that EC consumer interests, as well as
EC industry interests, are considered. 58 In fact, Member States now
must notify the Commission in advance of all draft regulations con-
cerning technical specifications that they intend to introduce in their
own territory. 59
Despite the provisions for EC Member State input, however,
non-EC member input has been limited at each critical stage of stan-
dard development: (1) when the Commission first drafts the
frameworks for the Directives, and (2) when CEN and CENELEC de-
velop technical specifications. Although European Free Trade Asso-
ciation (EFTA) countries can formally participate in the standard
setting process, 60 other non-EC member participation is at best in-
formal and indirect. 6' The most effective informal participants in
this process are multinational companies or those with affiliates or
subsidiaries in the EC. To understand the difficulty nonmember
state industries have in gaining access to the standardization process
law, pharmaceuticals and high technology medicines, chemical products, construction and
construction equipment, tower cranes, cosmetics, and even good laboratory practices for
nonchemical tests.
56 European Single Market, supra note 16, at 17. "ISO and IEC standards now comprise
43% of Danish standards, 37% of French standards, 22% of Dutch standards, 16% of
British standards, and 5% of German standards." Id.
57 WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, para. 72, at 21.
58 As discussed supra note 22, the EC considers EFTA interests even where other
non-EC members are excluded.
59 This provides for pre-approval by the Commission and the other member states.
See 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 109) art. 18, at 8 (1983) (Directive 83/189/EEC). If the
Commission and the other Member States determine that the draft regulations contain any
elements likely to create barriers to trade, they may start remedial action under Articles 30
and 100 of the Treaty of Rome. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, para. 75, at 21.
60 For information on the relationship between EFTA and the EC, see EEC AND
EFTA: MORE THAN JUST GOOD FRIENDS? (. Jamar & H. Wallace eds. 1988) (proceedings
of the symposium organized by the College of Europe in Bruges on 30 June and 2 July
1988).
61 Telephone interview with Donald Mackay, Former Chief, Office of Standards Code
and Information, National Institute of Standards and Technology (Mar. 7, 1990) [hereinaf-
ter Mackay Interview].
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it is necessary to examine the process from the formulation of
frameworks for essential requirements to the implementation of
technical specifications.
The standardization process is obtuse and many of the proce-
dures are unwritten. The process begins when the Commission de-
velops a proposed draft62 for "essential requirements" in a proposed
EC Directive. This Directive typically is revised through successive
drafts. At each stage in the drafting process the Commission may
seek the advice of individual EC industries or industry associations.
Nonmember industry input at this critical stage, however, depends
upon the industry's awareness of the proposed items and the access
of the individual participants to the process. Multinational corpora-
tions and non-EC companies with a base in Europe, therefore, have
an advantage. In practice, however, the process of developing draft
frameworks is closed to the general public and comment is not
solicited. 63
When the framework for a Directive is in final form the Commis-
sion transmits the document to the EC Parliament and EC Council.
At this stage, the proposal becomes generally available for review as
a public document. The Parliament, currently made up of 518 mem-
bers apportioned among the Member States, is not a legislative
body, but it is empowered to consider the proposed framework and
comment on the legislation.64 Parliament then transmits the propo-
sal, with its recommendations, to the Council of Ministers. The
Council may either finalize the proposal as a Directive, or return it to
Parliament for further consideration. The Council must coordinate
the general economic policies of the Member States and make the
decisions necessary to carry out the Treaty provisions. 65 Both the
Council and Parliament may receive comments about the proposal
from interested parties but no formal mechanism ensures their
consideration.
The Directive, when approved by the Council, binds member
and non-EC member states to the framework of "essential require-
ments" for the product or process at issue. These "essential require-
ments" are then adopted by each of the Member States in its
individual legislative process. Following Council approval, the
framework also passes to the relevant private standard setting body,
such as CENELEC or CEN, for the required development of specific,
62 Id. The Commission may develop a more specific standard at this stage, however,
which is normally considered a regulation.
63 Hrg. Rep. No. 23-441, supra note 11, at 22 (statement of Kyle Pitsor, manager of
International Affairs, National Electrical Manufacturers Association). See also Cooke &
Mackay, supra note 1, at 8.
64 Sitkov, supra note 46, at 181. Members of Parliament sit in political, rather than
national groups. Id.
65 Id. at 182.
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voluntary standards. 66 Eventually products must be marketed in ac-
cordance with the essential requirements as contained in the Direc-
tive. Although it is theoretically possible to demonstrate conformity
with the essential requirements themselves, the easiest way to
demonstrate compliance is to conform with the technical specifica-
tions of the regional bodies.
CEN and CENELEC are private sector organizations composed
of the standardization institutes of each Member State.67 The insti-
tutes, in turn, are either official governmental entities or private sec-
tor entities with official governmental recognition. An example of
the latter is the British Standards Institution.68 Each member insti-
tute has a maximum representation of three delegates to the techni-
cal committees of CEN and CENELEC. These three representatives
to the technical committees normally include industry representa-
tives, government officials, academicians, consumer advocates, or
some combination of these. 69 The functions of CEN and CENELEC
are also heavily subsidized by the Member States.
From a legal standpoint, non-EC member industries have the
same opportunity for notice and comment as Member State indus-
tries when the Directive passes through the Commission, the Parlia-
ment, and the Council. Because there is no formal mechanism for
notice and comment regarding the framework, both member and
66 WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, para. 68, at 19-20. The preparation and coordination
of the Council's work is carried out by the Committee of Permanent Representatives, com-
posed of national civil servants and ambassadors from Member States. See Sitkov, supra
note 46, at 182.
67 The members of CENELEC are: Austria (Osterreichisches Elektrotechnisches Komitee
(OKK), Usterreichischen Verbandfur Elektrotechnik (OVE)); Belgium (Comiti Electrotechnique Beige
(CEB)); Switzerland (Electrotechnique Suisse (CES)); Germany (Deutsche Elektrotechnische Kom-
mission im DIN und VDE (DKE)); Denmark (Dansk Electroteknish Komite (DEK)); Spain (Comite
Espanol del CENELEC (Associac'on Electrotcnica y Electronica Espanola (AEE)); Finland (Finnish
Electrotechnical Standards Assn. (SESKO)); France (Union Technique de l'Electriciti (UTE));
Greece (Hellenic Organization for Standardization (ELOT)); Ireland (Electro-Technical
Council of Ireland (ETCI)); Iceland (The Icelandic Council for Standardization, Techno-
logical Institute of Iceland); Italy (Comitato Elettrotecnico Italiano (CEI)); Luxemburg (Service
de l'Energie de l'Etat); the Netherlands (Nederlands Electrotechnisch Comiti (NEC)); Norway
(Norsk Electroteknisk Komite (NEK)); Portugal (Portuguese Institute for Quality); Sweden
(Swedish Electrotechnical Commission (SEK)); and the United Kingdom (British Electro-
technical Committee, British Standards Institute).
The eighteen members of CEN are: Spain (Associacion Espanola de Normalizacion y certifi-
cacion (AENOR)); France (Association Francaise de Normalisation (AFNOR)); United Kingdom
(British Standards Institution (BSI)); West Germany (Deutches Institutfiir Normung (DIN));
Denmark (Dansk Standardiseringsrad (DS)); Greece (Elimikos Prganismos Typopiiseos (ELOT));
Belgium (Institut Beige de Normalisation (IBN)); Portugal (Instituto Portuguis da Qualidade
(IPQO); Luxembourg (Inspection du Travail et des Mines (ITM)); the Netherlands (Nederlands
Normalisatie-Instituut (NNI)); Ireland (National Standards Authority of Ireland (NSAI));
Norway (Norges Standardiseringsforbund (NSF)); Austria (Osterreichisches Normungsinstitut (ON));
Finland (Suomen Standardisoimisliitto (SFS)); Sweden (Suomen Standardisenngskommissionen i
Sverige (SIS)); Switzerland (Schweizerische Normen-Vereinigung (SNV)); Iceland (Technological
Institute of Iceland (STRI)); Italy (Ente Nazionale italiano di Unificazione (UNI)).




nonmember concerns must be informally voiced through industry
representatives. From a practical standpoint, however, non-EC
member industries are placed at a severe disadvantage. EC indus-
tries have direct access either to the elected officials in Parliament or
to the appointed officials of the Commission, and thus their interests
may be represented there despite the non-nationalistic roles of these
groups. As a result, they are better informed of the progress of the
proceedings and the content of proposed drafts. They are also bet-
ter situated to comment on those drafts and to have their comments
considered. Furthermore, although there is an opportunity for non-
EC members to comment at both the Parliamentary and Council
stages of the proceedings, the interests of Member State industries
will likely receive primary consideration. The Ministers are not gen-
erally receptive to frameworks for essential requirements that do not
favor each of their own nation's economic interests. 70
C. The European Community "Voluntary" Standards
The development by CEN and CENELEC of technical specifica-
tions to conform with the essential requirements is perhaps the most
important stage in the promulgation of standards. The considera-
tion of detailed technical specifications at this stage is comparable to
the promulgation of proposed regulations by U.S. governmental
agencies, except that the standards developed by CEN and
CENELEC are voluntary. 71 Consideration of non-EC member inter-
70 "EC policymakers, like their U.S. counterparts, face internal pressure to protect
domestic industry from foreign competition. The extent to which these policymakers suc-
cumb to this internal pressure will test the EC's commitment to establishing a rational,
nonprotectionist European economy." Hrg. Rpt. No. 23-360, supra note 11, app. at 13.
71 The standards are voluntary only because it is possible to satisfy the essential re-
quirements directly. The notification aspects under the GATT Standards Code may be
applicable to the Directive-standards system. The GATT Code would not mandate notifi-
cation from these nongovernmental, voluntary standard setting bodies, regardless of
whether these standards are harmonized. Statement by Walter Leight, Acting Deputy Di-
rector, Office of Standards Services, Standards Code and Information, National Institute
of Standards and Technology, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Dec. 4, 1989 [copy maintained in
the office of N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.]. The standards promulgated by CEN and
CENELEC are given more weight than voluntary standards and are looked upon as regula-
tions. In hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, and on Inter-
national Economic Policy and Trade the following exchange took place:
Cong. GEJDENSON: If CEN/CENELEC writes standards . . . not similar
to American standards ... will not the European industry risk being shut out
of the U.S. market?
Mr. KINN: No.... [O]ur standards are predominantly voluntary. Their
standards become quasi-regulatory.
Cong. GEJDENSON: So in our case the standards are simply guide-
lines ... ?
Mr. KINN: In the U.S., that is the way it is. Unless a regulatory body of
the U.S. Government takes that standard over and makes it mandatory.
The standards they adopt . . . are . . . looked upon by everyone as a
regulation, not as a standard, and they follow them. We do not do that in the
United States.
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ests, however, is also limited at this stage. As noted, CEN and
CENELEC are private organizations advised by technical commit-
tees. EC Member States may have direct input to CEN and
CENELEC through their standardization institutes or through indus-
try representation on the technical committees.
The proceedings conducted by CEN and CENELEC are essen-
tially closed and nonmember industries have traditionally been unin-
formed of both the content of the proposals and the stage of their
review. 72 U.S. efforts to increase the transparency of standard devel-
opment within CEN and CENELEC have met with some minor suc-
cess. The American National Standards Institute has obtained
agreement from the executive board of CEN and CENELEC to pub-
lish a monthly review of their activity. 73
These concessions have served to make the process more trans-
parent. This has helped to alert nonmember industry to coming
changes so that they can timely adjust to those changes. However,
nonmember industry has limited and indirect input in developing
these changes. The EC has defended their "members only" stan-
dard setting process by stating that the EC does not have a seat at the
table for discussion of U.S. trade policy, such as the trade policy
under the 1988 Trade Act.7" The EC also argues that the negotiated
settlement, whereby U.S. firms would receive the working papers
used by CEN and CENELEC before the draft standard is issued to
the public, will alleviate any problems otherwise caused by the failure
to allow U.S. firms to participate directly in the process of standard
setting. In addition, the EC cites nonmember state participation in
the international standard setting organizations such as the Interna-
tional Standards Organization (ISO) and the International Electro-
technical Commission (IEC), in which EC Member States also
participate, as evidence of nonmember state input. This response by
the EC, however, misses the point. EC industry has always had seats
at the table of hundreds of organizations throughout the United
States and in non-EC countries that set voluntary product standards.
EC industry has also been free to comment on nonvoluntary stan-
dards promulgated by U.S. agencies. 75 Furthermore, although the
agreement to advise U.S. businesses of the stage in the proceeding
and to disclose working papers represents an improvement in the
system, there are no guarantees that this information will be pro-
Hrg. Rep. 23-44 1, supra note 11, at 269.
72 Hrg. Rep. 23-441, supra note 1I, at 295.
73 See EC Official Rejects Role for Outsider on Standards, But Promised Flexibility, Daily Exec.
Rep. (BNA) No. 82, at A-I (May 1, 1989). U.S. Dept. of Commerce News, International
Trade Administration, Press Release No. ITA 89-68 (Oct. 6, 1989).
74 Hrg. Rep. 23-360, supra note II, app. at 30.
75 Id. See supra note 51.
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vided in a complete and timely fashion. 76 Moreover, working papers
are not an adequate substitute for discussions of the positions of the
various interests and the chance to offer comments on the proper
standard to the participants while the standard is in its formative
stage. Without the ability to examine the information on which the
final decision for a standard is based, non-EC companies can have
little influence, and will be effectively excluded from the standard
setting process. 77 Although CEN and CENELEC have agreed to use
international standards where they exist, the European influence on
the development of these standards must be considered. The EC
and EFTA countries control eighteen votes at the national level.
Other countries, such as the United States, have only one vote.
III. The U.S. Administrative Procedure Act in Application to
Standard Setting Bodies
Since 1946 the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 78 has speci-
fied the formal procedure that U.S. agencies must follow when issu-
ing rules, whether they be legislative or adjudicatory. 79 The APA
requires that agencies engaged in standard setting or rulemaking:
(1) provide the public with notice of the proposed rulemaking;80 (2)
solicit and consider comments on the proposed rule by interested
parties;8' and (3) issue a "concise general statement of their basis
76 A delay in notifying U.S. companies can create a significant competitive edge. Hrg.
Rep. No. 23-441, supra note 11, at 265 (statement of Mr. Kinn, Staff Vice President, Elec-
tronic Industries Association).
77 Hrg. Rep. 23-360, supra note 11, app. at 28. For an account of the difficulties a
firm may experience as a result of differing product standards, see Getting Your Bear to
Market or Breaking the "Bear-iers " to Product Approval Under the New Toy Safety Directive (Annex
II, U.S. Chamber of Commerce) [copy maintained in the office of N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM.
REG.].
78 Pub. L. No. 404, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) amended by Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80
Stat. 378 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (1988)).
79 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553-54 (1988). The APA has evolved considerably from legislative
amendment and judicial construction. Some legislative changes include: Pub. L. No. 90-
23, § 2, 81 Stat. 56 (1967); Pub. L. No. 90-83, § I(l)(B), 81 Stat. 195 (1967); Pub. L. No.
93-579, § 4, 88 Stat. 1905 (1974); and Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 3(b), 90 Stat. 1246 (1976).
80 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1988). With respect to the notice requirements, 'the Act
provides:
(b) General notice of proposed rulemaking shall be published in the
Federal Register, unless persons subject thereto . . . have actual notice
thereof .... The notice shall include -
(I) a statement of the time, place and nature of public rulemaking pro-
ceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed;
and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of
the subject and issues involved.
Id.
81 Id. § 553(c). The Act provides that, "[after notice required . . . the agency shall
give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking through submis-
sion of written data, views, or argument ..... Id.
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and purpose"8 2 justifying the rule in light of comments received.83
The publication requirements do not apply to interpretative rules or
policy statements.8 4 They also do not apply when notice is impracti-
cable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.8 5
The APA is bolstered by a 1978 Executive Order requiring that
agencies adopt procedures to conform existing and future regula-
tions to the APA: "To achieve these objectives, regulations shall be
developed through a process which ensures that ... opportunity ex-
ists for early participation and comment by... businesses, organiza-
tions and other members of the public . . . [so that] meaningful
alternatives are considered and analyzed before the regulation is is-
sued .... "86 The most common form of rulemaking under the APA
is informal and is governed by Section 553.87 Formal rulemaking is
less common but provides for notice and comment.88
The purpose of the APA notice requirement is not to allow par-
ties to insist that a rule be fashioned in a particular way, but rather to
assure fairness and mature consideration of rules of general applica-
tion and to give affected members of the public an opportunity to
comment.8 9 Solicitation of comments allowing public participation
in the rulemaking process is fundamental to the APA. Moreover, it
serves as an efficient channel through which experts in the field can
provide information that may have been overlooked by the agency.90
Through this forum experts can discover abstruse effects of pro-
posed rules, demonstrate a need for alternatives, and propose less
burdensome or more appropriate alternatives.9 1 In sum, notice and
comment rulemaking results in more informed decisionmaking in
matters of substantial impact.92
82 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1988). See also National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. Federal
Trade Comm'n, 392 F.Supp. 1052, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (requiring the government to
consider the relevant matters presented).
83 Rockway v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 514 F.2d 809, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
84 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A)-(B) (1988).
85 Id.
86 Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (1978). For a discussion of the pro-
cedure by which U.S. agencies must consider the effects of their rules on small entities, see
Freedman, Singer & Swain, The Regulatory Flexibility Act: Orienting Federal Regulation to Small
Business, 93 DICK. L. REv. 439 (1989).
87 5 U.S.C. § 553.
88 Id. §§ 553, 556.
89 American Standard Inc. v. United States, 602 F.2d 256, 267 (Ct. Cl. 1979). See also
Pacific Coast European Conference v. United States, 350 F.2d 197, 205-06 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 958 (1965).
90 An example of a recent voluntary U.S. government standard developed with the
input of industry is United States Standards for Grades of Canned Pineapples, 55 Fed.
Reg. 3,029 (1990).
91 Dow Chemical U.S.A. v. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n, 459 F. Supp. 378, 391
(W.D. La. 1978).
92 Standard Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 596 F.2d 1029, 1058 (Temp. Emer.




A. Public Accountability: The Essential Requirement of Basis and
Findings
It is clear from the legislative history of the APA that the U.S.
Congress recognized a need for relating rules to a factual basis:
"The agency must analyze and consider all relevant material
presented. The required statement of the basis and purpose of rules
issued should not only relate to the data so presented but with rea-
sonable fullness explain the factual basis and objectives of the
rule." s9 3 Demonstrable evidence that the agency has in fact consid-
ered comments of the public is necessary not only to justify the
agency's decision in the eyes of the public, but also to force the
agency to consider suggestions systematically.
Since the APA's adoption, the judicial and legislative branches
have expanded the requirement that the agency disclose the "gen-
eral basis and purpose" of a rule or standard far beyond what ap-
pears on the face of the APA.94 For example, in Automotive Parts and
Accessories Association v. Boyd,95 the court found that the "concise gen-
eral statement of basis and purpose" must enable the public to "see
what major issues of policy were ventilated by the . . . proceedings
... and why the agency reacted to them as it did."' 96 A more signifi-
cant expansion occurred in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA). 9 7 The court in Kennecott found that in the
interest of "expeditious disposition of changes to standards (the Ad-
ministrator of the EPA] is required to supply an implementing state-
ment that will enlighten the court as to the basis on which he reached
the ... standard." 9 8 Even if the rules turn on choices of policy', on
assessment of risks, or on predictions dealing with matters on the
frontiers of scientific knowledge, the courts have interpreted the
APA to demand "adequate reasons and explanations. " 9 9 In short,
the APA contemplates that rules will be made through a constructive
dialogue between agency experts and concerned members of the
public. 100
93 S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess. 201, 259 (1946).
94 See I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6:12, at 496 (1972).
95 407 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (concerning federal automotive safety standards).
96 Id. at 338.
97 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (involving a rule promulgated by the EPA limiting
sulfur oxide output to 60 micrograms per meter).
98 Id. at 850.
99 Amoco Oil Co. v U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 501 F.2d 722, 741 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
100 Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 59 CORN.
L. REV. 375, 381 (1974). See contra Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. National Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 523-25 (1978). "Even apart from the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act this Court has . . . emphasized that the formation of [review]
procedures [are] basically to be left within the discretion of the agencies to which Con-
gress ha[s] confided the responsibility for substantive judgment." Id. at 524.
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B. Application to EC Standard Setting
The methods and procedures embodied in the APA are in strik-
ing contrast to those employed in EC standard setting. The APA
does not give U.S.-based companies more consideration or greater
access than foreign-based companies for purposes of considering
comments. It invites and considers comments by all interested par-
ties during the development of standards while there is still adequate
time for meaningful consideration.
The APA has governed the issuance of thousands of pages of
regulations dealing with issues ranging from the deceptive labeling
and advertising of adhesive compositions,' 0 1 to standards relating to
pesticides, 10 2 livestock,103 sleeping bag sizes, 10 4 fresh fruit, vegeta-
bles, and other food products. 10 5 In 1989 the APA served as the
mechanism for the promulgation of more than one thousand pro-
posed rules. The APA has been successful as a methodical approach
to standard setting, resulting in rules that are better constructed to
effect intent with minimal burden.
The APA has direct application to the EC standard setting pro-
cess in that it provides a useful model for the consideration of com-
ments. The APA also is a valuable tool because of the considerable
body of case law interpreting the statute. 10 6 Through the develop-
ment of a written procedure following the primary guidelines of the
APA-the requirement of notice, solicitation of comment, and dis-
closure of basis and findings-EC and non-EC industries would ben-
efit from rules issued as a result of informed decisionmaking. The
APA would be especially helpful at the CEN or CENELEC stage,
when the details of standards are determined. This stage in the pro-
cess is equivalent to standard setting at the U.S. agency level. It also
is the stage where the political decision of what type of standards
should be set is replaced with the implementation of regulations ef-
fecting that political intent.
101 16 C.F.R. § 235 (1989).
102 40 C.F.R. § 155 (1989).
103 7 C.F.R. § 53 (1989).
104 16 C.F.R. § 400 (1989).
105 7 C.F.R. § 51 (1989).
106 A plethora of cases highlight U.S. agency requirements to consider the views of
interested parties when setting standards. See, e.g., National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v.
Federal Drug Administration, 504 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1974); Chrysler Corp. v. Department
of Transportation, 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972); Corn Products Co. v. Department of
Health, Education & Welfare, 427 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1970); Marshall v. Pittsburgh-Des
Moines Steel Co., 584 F.2d 638 (3d Cir. 1978); Laminators Safety Glass Ass'n v. Consumer
Product Safety Comm'n, 578 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Riegel Textile Corp. v. Celanese
Corp., 649 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1981); National Knitwear Mfrs. Ass'n. v. Consumer Product




More open participation in the EC standard setting process
would be beneficial not only for U.S. interests, but also for the pro-
motion of trade between the EC and nonmember states. The same
goals that have guided European efforts to unify standards support
efforts to extend those standards to nonmember nations. Input on
standard setting will ensure greater coordination between EC and
non-EC products, will facilitate joint ventures, will eliminate need-
less duplicate testing for goods destined for global distribution, and
will discourage dumping of nonconforming products. Moreover, it
will permit the EC to draw upon a broader pool of environmental
studies, health and safety studies, and methods of practice, so that
standards are more efficiently and effectively designed.
Application of the principles embodied in the U.S. Administra-
tive Procedure Act, most notably the notice and comment require-
ments, could help achieve this result. Applying the APA procedures
to CEN and CENELEC would permit non-EC member companies
and their representatives to provide formal input on the standard
under consideration. The weight accorded this input would not de-
pend on physical presence in the EC or on political access, but upon
the merits of the issues raised. Furthermore, by adopting an APA-
type approach, the EC will consider the views of all participants,
avoiding the perception of arbitrarily designed rules.
The purpose of this Article was to describe the standard setting
process in the EC in order to reveal the need for greater openness
and more effective participation by non-EC member state industries.
The benefits from harmonized standards are clear, yet the process by
which the standards are set can by improved by building into the
procedure a method whereby participation by interested parties
outside the European Community is solicited and considered.
The underlying economic principle of the Treaty of Rome and
the Single European Act is that uniformity of otherwise diverse na-
tional requirements, especially standards, ensures free transferability
of goods and services. This assists suppliers and consumers alike by
creating a more efficient system for the production and marketing of
goods. This principle can be better served if applied without preju-
dice to the global economy.
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